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The Sources and Consequences
of Political Rhetoric
I S S U E I M P O R TA N C E , C O L L E G I A L B A R G A I N I N G , A N D
DISAGREEABLE RHETORIC IN SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
MICHAEL ZILIS,

University of Kentucky

JUSTIN WEDEKING,

University of Kentucky

ABSTRACT

How do political actors use rhetoric after an initial policy battle? We explore factors that lead Supreme
Court justices to integrate disagreeable rhetoric into opinions. Although disagreeable language has negative
consequences, we posit that justices pay this cost for issues with high personal signiﬁcance. At the same
time, we argue that integrating disagreeable rhetoric has a deleterious effect on the institution by reducing
majority coalition size. Examining opinions from 1946 to 2011 using text-based measures of disagreeable
rhetoric, we model the language of opinion writing as well as explore the consequences for coalition size.
Our ﬁndings suggest serious implications for democratic institutions and political rhetoric.

Disagreeable rhetoric is among the most powerful persuasive tools available to political actors. Aristotle’s Rhetoric argues that discourse rooted in anger and indignation has the ability to “change men as to affect their judgments.” Riker (1996) conceptualizes harsh rhetoric
as a high-utility tool that enables the targeting of messages and provides political actors the
ability to “weaken the resolve of their opponents” (67). More recent scholarship veriﬁes
the multidimensional “importance of rhetoric” (Garsten 2011, 160) in a variety of institutional (e.g., Wedeking 2010; Grose, Malhotra, and Van Houweling 2015) and campaign contexts (e.g., Skaperdas and Grofman 1995; Sigelman and Buell 2003; Druckman,
Kifer, and Parkin 2009; Fridkin and Kenney 2011).
These approaches greatly enrich our understanding of political and legal strategy as well
as democratic theory. Yet much of the work on rhetoric shares a common feature in that it
explores political and legal discourse when actors have short-term goals in mind. These
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goals often take the forms of winning an upcoming election, increasing one’s popularity,
or winning struggles over policy. As a result, a fundamental question remains unanswered:
Why would policy makers employ disagreeable rhetoric even after short-term policy debates have been settled? This article aims to broaden our theoretical window into the
use of rhetoric during an overlooked phase of the political process, the period after a
policy decision has been made. We theorize that an understudied aspect of the political
and legal environment, the personal importance of an issue, inﬂuences the extent to which
actors adjust their rhetorical tone. Furthermore, we argue that these adjustments have important implications for the nature of decision making on collegial institutions as well as
support for political and legal institutions more generally.
In our study we examine the use of disagreeable rhetoric in the written, signed opinions
of the US Supreme Court. In common-law systems like the United States, it is not only the
decisions of judges to afﬁrm or reverse but also the written opinions that accompany them
that shape the law and public reaction.1 As one study observes, in order to further their jurisprudential and policy legacies, “justices wish to write legally strong, persuasive opinions”
(Corley, Collins, and Calvin 2011, 34; see also Murphy 1964). Because the rhetoric used
in Court opinions allows justices to inﬂuence policy debates even after a controversy has
been resolved, we expect that justices use harsh rhetoric to emphasize their positions
and discredit opponents. At the same time, the use of disagreeable language may have negative consequences from an institutional perspective. We argue that justices are willing to
pay the long-term costs of disagreeability when an issue is of high personal importance to
them. When justices feel strongly about a case or issue, they place a premium on engaging
in a rhetorical struggle with their opponents, and they use harsh rhetoric even though it
may negatively impact the Court as an institution. We ﬁnd evidence consistent with
our account across a variety of opinion types, including separate concurring and dissenting
opinions in which authors have signiﬁcant control over content.
Yet, given that the opinion-writing and bargaining process is endogenous, we also anticipate that the use of disagreeable language, although more prevalent on issues that are
important to the justices, has consequences for bargaining among the justices. Speciﬁcally,
we demonstrate that disagreeable rhetoric in majority opinions is common and posit that
it will lead fewer justices to join the majority coalition, which has potential implications for
the Court’s popular support. To model this endogeneity, we use two-stage least squares
estimation, with instrumental variables for each stage, to explore the linkage between disagreeable rhetoric and the size of the majority coalition. Our ﬁndings demonstrate that
more disagreeable rhetoric leads to a smaller majority coalition. This suggests serious concerns for bargaining when justices use harsh language.
Our work has three major implications. First, we are able to demonstrate that justices
may eschew the long-term goal of maintaining institutional support when an issue
1. The most powerful illustration of this contention may be n. 4 in United States v. Carolene Products (304 U.S. 144 [1938]), an apparent sidebar in Justice Stone’s majority opinion that has nonetheless
shaped decades of equal protection law.
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becomes important enough. This means, for instance, that justices may utilize harsh opinion language with the hopes of inﬂuencing subsequent legal developments and policy debates. Second, in cases in which larger coalitions provide beneﬁts, our ﬁndings have implications for the opinion assignment literature. Because justices who feel strongly about an
issue write in starkly different terms, a justice with assignment power must consider the
types of opinions that will be written and the subsequent inﬂuence of opinion language
when selecting an author.
Finally, our work raises the possibility that institutional support may decline when the
Supreme Court relies on disagreeable rhetoric, as it has been increasingly willing to do.
Such language may violate norms of sober, thoughtful decision making that help courts
maintain support, but we are also able to show that disagreeable rhetoric has the more immediate effect of increasing division on the bench. This implies that as the Court’s norms
change and its justices become more comfortable with harsh language, this may contribute
to the perception of ideological disagreement on the Court that is vitally linked to public
support for the institution.
C O N C E P T UA L I Z I N G D I S AG R E E A B L E R H E TO R I C
ON THE SUPREME COURT

As we conceptualize it, disagreeable rhetoric consists of language with harsh, unpleasant,
or negative connotations. Harsh rhetoric is used as an integral part of a framing strategy
to structure audience expectations in order to persuade (Tannen 1993; see also Murphy
1964; Entman 1993). In the electoral context, emphasizing negative aspects primes emotional responses (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014, 234) and allows the messenger to inﬂuence a variety of attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Knoll, Redlawsk, and Sanborn 2011). Scholars have a more limited understanding of disagreeable rhetoric when it comes to the judicial
branch, but research demonstrates that it is on the rise at the US Supreme Court and pervades multiple types of opinions (Bryan and Ringsmuth 2016; Wedeking and Zilis 2018),
which suggests a need for more careful attention to how it comes about and the implications that result.
In order to add nuance, we consider in more detail the deﬁning features of disagreeable
rhetoric in the context of the Supreme Court. While justices may integrate harsh language
at multiple stages, including oral argument and private deliberations, we are particularly
interested in opinion language for a few reasons. First, opinions have a great deal of substantive importance from legal and policy-making perspectives. This is certainly true with
respect to majority opinions of the Court, but even dissents and concurrences have the
capacity to inﬂuence subsequent policy developments by constraining the impact of majority opinions and signaling conﬂict to other actors (Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Maltzman
1999; Urofsky 2017). Relatedly, justices are very deliberate about their opinion language
(Black, Owens, Wedeking, and Wohlfarth 2016) since legal and political elites pay close
attention. Finally, the language of majority opinions in particular has been shown to inﬂuence media coverage and public responses, suggesting implications for the Court’s popular standing (Zilis, Wedeking, and Denison 2017).

206

|

JOURNAL OF LAW AND COURTS

|

FA L L 2 0 2 0

With this in mind, disagreeable opinion language consists of a few key features. First,
this language highlights unpleasant or negative characteristics for interested audiences
(Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997, 225–28), which is valuable because negative information has a higher likelihood of capturing audience attention and sticking in memory
(Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000; Entman 2004; Brader 2005) and tends to be
weighted more heavily in attitude formation (Lau 1985). In the context of the Supreme
Court, some noteworthy opinions adopt this tactic. For example, the recounting of the
facts in Roper v. Simmons (543 U.S. 551 [2005]) describes a horriﬁc chain of events, strongly
emphasizing the brutal act of the crime, which ultimately sets the stage for the Court’s
legal reasoning that follows. In the legal reasoning, the majority opinion repeatedly uses
the term “death penalty” (over 80 times) while also taking a confrontational tone toward
the petitioner’s arguments. This is far from the only example of the justices detailing unsettling facts to frame their arguments. In a recent opinion that attracted popular attention, Clarence Thomas went to “great lengths” to describe a murder and criticized his colleagues for leaving out these details (de Vogue and Cole 2019). Such language ﬁts within
our conceptualization of disagreeable rhetoric by strongly emphasizing negative aspects
as part of its persuasive approach.
In addition to emphasizing negative aspects, disagreeable rhetoric may also feature an
overall unfavorable tone (see, speciﬁcally, Zilis et al. 2017 and, more generally, Young and
Soroka 2012). This particular aspect of opinions has garnered signiﬁcant attention in recent years, with some commentators worried about the rise in harsh emotional language
on the Court. Court observers often noted the language used by Justice Scalia, whose opinions characterize opponents in very unﬂattering terms (Chemerinsky 2015). Unfavorable
language also appears from different quarters of the Court, such as when Justice Alito suggested the “irredeemable corruption” of constitutional interpretation in the federal judiciary (Gerstein 2015). But while popular attention tends to focus on isolated examples
of harsh tone, we note that similarly heated rhetoric has worked its way into many other
opinions over time (Wedeking and Zilis 2018).
In short, our understanding of disagreeable rhetoric on the Supreme Court identiﬁes a
few important conceptual features, including the emphasis on unpleasant characteristics
and use of an unfavorable tone. This language appears increasingly common on the Court
and in multiple types of opinions. Indeed, in spite of the fact that commentators often
highlight disagreeable rhetoric in dissents, there is nothing to prevent the majority from
adopting this language as well, which is critical given that their opinions carry the force
of law. We examine in more detail the differences across types of opinions in subsequent
sections.
S T R AT E G I C C O N S I D E R AT I O N S R E L E VA N T
TO D I S A G R E E A B L E R H E TO R I C

Supreme Court justices act strategically when crafting opinion language. With multiple
audiences and goals in mind, justices in the majority aim to build public support, bring
about implementation, and evade congressional oversight through adjustments in the
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clarity and complexity of their writing (Owens and Wedeking 2011; Owens, Wedeking,
and Wohlfarth 2013; Black, Owens, Wedeking, and Wohlfarth 2016). Majority justices
also make use of strategic citation patterns in order to signal stronger legal support for
their opinions (Corley, Howard, and Nixon 2006; Hume 2006) and, more germane
to our purposes, adjust their level of disagreeable language depending on the salience
of a case in order to safeguard popular support (Wedeking and Zilis 2018). For dissenters, aggressive language is common on issues about which justices feel strongly and for
which they value policy outcomes over the legitimacy of the institution itself (Cross and
Pennebaker 2014; Bryan and Ringsmuth 2016).
On the whole, existing work views disagreeable rhetoric as a product of the justices’ desire to take clear positions for interested audiences (Cross and Pennebaker 2014); justices
have long been seen as concerned about their reputations among audiences (Baum 1994,
2006). Using disagreeable language is valuable not only as a framing device but also as a way
to raise the salience of speciﬁc policy considerations that the justices seek to emphasize.
The literature supplies additional traction when we broaden the focus beyond opinion
rhetoric and look at other forms of contentious or disagreeable behavior, which are also
becoming increasingly common (e.g., Black, Owens, and Wedeking 2016; Rice and Zorn
2016). One study explains, “The use of anger may seem to be a lapse by the justices [but]
the use of emotion may be a strategic tool that makes opinions more powerful” (Cross and
Pennebaker 2014, 890; emphasis added). Consistent with this insight, Johnson, Black,
and Ringsmuth (2009) show that judges become more likely to read oral dissents when
a dissent’s ideological distance from the majority increases and the majority coalition
is a minimum winning one. Conversely, interpersonal cooperation can dissuade justices
from behaving in a disagreeable fashion. For example, the reading of oral dissents becomes
less likely when one has worked with the majority opinion author in the past (Blake and
Hacker 2010). This view squares with a broader literature showing that interpersonal relationships play a critical role for policy-minded justices (Haynie 1992; Epstein and
Knight 1998; Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000). In the short term, collegial accommodation allows justices to persuade colleagues to sign on to a speciﬁc opinion, while
in the long term it fosters mutually beneﬁcial interactions among the group.2 Again, however, noncollegiality is not just the province of dissenting justices (e.g., Black, Johnson,
and Wedeking 2012; Cross and Pennebaker 2014; Rice and Zorn 2016; Smith 2017),
although it is an approach that dissenters frequently use (Johnson et al. 2009).
Therefore, existing work suggests that strategic considerations inﬂuence both the majority and the dissent in terms of their willingness to employ disagreeable rhetoric. To be
clear, this does not always mean that the coalitions write the same types of opinions but
rather that both are guided by strategic considerations when they act. An important underlying goal for both is to build support for their positions at the expense of their opponents.

2. Awareness of this extends to justices in the opinion-crafting process as well. For example, upon
reading a clerk’s draft of what became the landmark opinion in Carolene Products, Justice Stone focused
his changes on “toning down a couple of over-emphatic words” (Mason 1956, 513).
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Finally, we note an additional drawback of disagreeability: its ability to weaken the
Court’s popular authority (Epstein, Segal, and Spaeth 2001, 362–63; Baird and Gangl
2006; Zink, Spriggs, and Scott 2009). Because media coverage tends to track closely the
language used by the Court majority in reporting on decisions (Zilis 2015), an important
cost associated with breaches of collegiality is sensationalist or divisive portrayals of rulings
to the public, which hamper the Court’s support ( Johnston and Bartels 2010). Simply put,
the Court’s rhetoric matters in shaping responses to decisions.3
In sum, the literature suggests two primary insights. First, justices adjust the language
of their opinions as part of a framing strategy for external audiences. When it comes speciﬁcally to disagreeable rhetoric, this language allows justices to make salient their positions
for interested audiences and inﬂuence the reception that external actors give to rulings.
Second, we note that disagreeable behavior harms the ability to bargain with one’s colleagues and may also have costs in terms of institutional support. Focusing on these costs
and beneﬁts, we next build our theory of disagreeable rhetoric with an application to Supreme Court opinions.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Personal Importance and Disagreeable Language

Disagreeable language is costly in that it may signal the breakdown of bargaining among
the justices and have reputational costs for individual justices and the institution as a
whole. Furthermore, the use of disagreeable rhetoric is potentially more costly than other
rhetorical approaches that have been the subject of study, such as the citation to precedent
or other legal writings (Corley, Howard, and Nixon 2006; Hume 2006). Whereas the latter may simply increase resource and time pressures, disagreeable rhetoric may also make it
more difﬁcult to attract ambivalent colleagues to sign on to opinions both contemporaneously and in the future. To the extent that disagreeable rhetoric violates Court norms and
is seen as beyond the bounds of acceptable rhetoric, it may come at a reputational cost to
the justices who employ it and, more signiﬁcantly, the Court itself. However, justices may
have reason to pay the costs associated with disagreeable language for important goals in
order to inﬂuence the views of external audiences (Bryan and Ringsmuth 2016).
In other words, disagreeable rhetoric has beneﬁts and costs for the justices when writing their opinions. The language can be used as part of a framing strategy to effectively
discredit opponents, but it may also negatively impact the ability to bargain with one’s
colleagues and the reputation of the institution more generally. We theorize that opinion
authors weigh these trade-offs and become more apt to use disagreeable language when a
dispute concerns an issue that is highly important or signiﬁcant to them personally. In
these instances, justices place a premium on making a point to observers and discrediting
3. This sentiment was echoed by Chief Justice Roberts, who recently emphasized the historical
importance of “making sure people [justices] disagreed without being disagreeable” since “somebody
does have to represent the institution to the outside world” (de Vogue 2015).
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opponents, even if this means that they must be more aggressive in their use of disagreeable
rhetoric.
Our focus on personal importance as a central determinant of harsh rhetoric is based
on the observation that justices are most likely to accept the costs associated with disagreeableness when they feel strongly about a matter before the Court and when they value inﬂuencing subsequent developments through effective persuasion. In other words, our concept of personal importance considers the extent to which justices feel strongly about
particular issues, which has implications for how they behave in relevant cases. As Baum
observes, “some goals are sufﬁciently important that people have strong incentives to act
on their behalf ” (2006, 15), and we recognize that different factors may inﬂuence the issues a justice ﬁnds personally important. Speciﬁcally, we anticipate that justices may be
more apt to hold strong feelings about issues that are legally signiﬁcant or politically salient
or those about which they have personal experience or expertise.
On important issues, integrating disagreeable language supplies justices with a powerful rhetorical strategy to persuade audiences. Consistent with this observation, research
demonstrates that highly contentious and high-proﬁle cases tend to generate more heated
rhetoric on the Court (Hume and Guidry-Leingang 2017). Building on this, we anticipate
that justices’ desires to persuade in cases that are important to them gives rise to an increased willingness to employ aggressive rhetoric. This allows them to emphasize the position taken or aggressively attack the arguments made by their opponents.
Personal Importance Hypothesis: As an issue becomes more personally important to an opinion author, this leads to an increase in disagreeable language.
At the same time, we recognize that distinct dynamics govern the writing of majority
versus separate opinions. Although we expect that authors use more disagreeable rhetoric
on personally important issues, we do not expect that authors of majority and separate
opinions will integrate the same level of disagreeable rhetoric, since there is likely to be
more negotiation over majority opinions. For this reason, we focus on separate opinion
writing in the ﬁrst part of our analysis in order to understand the effects of personal importance on disagreeable rhetoric.
Disagreeable Language and Coalition Size

Although our theoretical framework offers insight about how one overlooked factor, the
personal importance of an issue, inﬂuences the disagreeability of opinions, it has an additional testable implication. A major reason that justices are more willing to use disagreeable
rhetoric on issues of high importance to them is that they value discrediting their opponents’ arguments. Yet when majority opinions become highly disagreeable, it has an added
cost of making it more difﬁcult to persuade other justices to join (or maintain others
already in the majority coalition). This is because each individual justice has preferences
over not only a case disposition but also the content of opinions themselves (Clark and
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Carrubba 2012), and opinions that feature disagreeable rhetoric may be off-putting to
colleagues.
Indeed, we can observe the importance that justices place on opinion rhetoric by looking to bargaining interactions on the Court. In Mapp v. Ohio (367 U.S. 643 [1961]), for
example, Justice Harlan expressed in a note to Justice Clark that he was “unable to understand why a ground for deciding this case should have been chosen which is not only
highly debatable and divisive. . . . I earnestly ask you to reconsider the advisability of
facing the Court, in a case which otherwise should ﬁnd a ready and non-controversial
solution, with the controversial issues that your proposed opinion tenders.”4 Harlan’s actions indicate the bargaining costs associated with divisive majority opinions; unsatisﬁed
by Clark’s response to his memo, Harlan ultimately issued a dissent in Mapp. Alternatively,
during bargaining in United States v. Hensley (469 U.S. 221 [1985]), Justice Stevens asked
the Court to recast its opinion in a more modest light, which allowed him to sign on
(Maltzman et al. 2000, 156–57).
There are numerous other examples of bargaining over opinion language (Spriggs,
Maltzman, and Wahlbeck 1999), and these indicate that harsh or divisive language is a
source of concern for justices when considering whether to sign on to a majority opinion.
Therefore, we anticipate that, in majority opinions in particular, the use of disagreeable
language makes it more difﬁcult for a potential author to bargain with ambivalent colleagues, with consequences for the size of the Court’s majority coalition in a given case.
Coalition Size Hypothesis: As disagreeable rhetoric increases in a majority opinion, the size of the majority coalition decreases.
E M P I R I C A L S T R AT E G Y

Our empirical approach proceeds in two steps. First, we explore our personal importance
hypothesis, which predicts that opinion authors become more willing to integrate disagreeable rhetoric on issues that are personally important to them. While there are several
avenues to study this, we focus our ﬁrst analysis on the rhetoric in separate (nonmajority)
opinions. This is advisable because the justices have signiﬁcant control over the content of
their concurring and dissenting opinions. Unlike for majority opinions, there is no incentive to bargain over opinion language in order to maintain a winning coalition, making for
an appropriate test of our justice-speciﬁc personal importance hypothesis.
After showing that the importance increases the likelihood that justices will integrate
disagreeable rhetoric in separate opinions, we then proceed to our second analysis, which
involves analyzing the consequences of disagreeability, particularly as they concern the size
of the Court’s majority coalition. We anticipate that disagreeable rhetoric in majority opinions will inﬂuence the size of the coalition. However, we are also cognizant of concerns
4. “The Papers of Justice Tom C. Clark,” Tarleton Law Library, University of Texas, https://
tarltonapps.law.utexas.edu/clark/pdf/mapp/a115-06-03.pdf.
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with endogeneity or reverse causation, in which coalition size may inﬂuence opinion rhetoric. In other words, while harsh rhetoric may cause some justices to refuse to join, it may
also be the case that coalition size inﬂuences disagreeable rhetoric in an opinion.5
Given these concerns, we use two-stage least squares as an estimation strategy in our
second analysis because it is designed to account for endogenous relationships. The ﬁrststage equation explains disagreeable opinion rhetoric as a function of the issue’s personal
importance to the opinion author as well as a series of other covariates. We then estimate
a second-stage equation to explain coalition size as a function of disagreeable opinion
rhetoric and a series of other covariates. Estimating a two-stage least squares model requires us to identify instrumental variables that are exogenous for each stage.
For the ﬁrst-stage equation, we use the personal importance to author variable as
an instrument for estimating disagreeable opinion rhetoric (i.e., personal importance to
the author directly inﬂuences opinion rhetoric but not the size of the majority coalition).
To evaluate the theoretical justiﬁcation for this instrument, we draw on our ﬁrst analysis,
which demonstrates that personal importance inﬂuences the extent to which justices rely
on disagreeable language in their opinions. Speciﬁcally, justices are more likely to compose
a harsh opinion on a case of high personal importance than any other case.
To evaluate the instrument’s validity for majority coalitions, we consider the concern
that other (nonauthor) justices may vary in their likelihood of joining a coalition given the
importance they place on the case. In other words, one threat to validity might occur when
the importance of an issue to nonopinion authors inﬂuences their likelihood of joining a
coalition, thus affecting the second-stage equation. This objection necessitates that we account for the aggregate importance of an issue to all other justices, and not just the majority
opinion author, since this factor is likely to inﬂuence their voting behavior. To do so, we
include an aggregate importance control variable in our ﬁrst- and second-stage equations.
This variable captures the importance that nonauthor justices place on a given case. The
personal importance to author instrument, however, is included only in the ﬁrst stage.6
For the second-stage equation, whether the Court is operating with a missing member
(i.e., if it has all nine members or not) is a theoretically appropriate instrument.7 This factor should have a strong link to estimating the size of the majority coalition, since cases in
which the Court is at less than full strength have fewer members available to sign on to a
majority opinion, but it is not theoretically expected to inﬂuence the disagreeability of
an opinion. To ensure the validity of this instrument, we have performed a number of
5. This correlation could cut in one of two directions. If there is little prospect that justices will
abandon the majority, smaller majority coalitions may be free to write more disagreeable opinions. But
if there is the potential for defection, smaller majority coalitions may be forced to limit their disagreeable
language in order to maintain their majority.
6. Keep in mind that because the unit of analysis is the opinion (not the justice level), we have to
account for the nonauthors’ importance in some aggregated fashion (i.e., it is not possible to simply include each individual justice’s importance score).
7. Although it may seem uncommon for cases to feature a missing justice, in actuality the event is
not all that rare. In our sample 1,402 cases include a missing member (21%).
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robustness checks, omitting the most common missing members from our analysis to ensure that the recusals of highly disagreeable justices are not driving the results. Additionally, the results of a Sargen-Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions do not allow rejection of the null hypothesis that both the ﬁrst- and second-stage instruments are valid.
To summarize our empirical approach, we begin by evaluating our personal importance hypothesis, showing how this factor increases the use of disagreeable language,
particularly in separate opinions in which an author has signiﬁcant control over content.
Then, we model the endogenous relationship between disagreeable language and coalition size for majority opinions. We ﬁnd that highly disagreeable majority opinions attract
smaller coalitions of justices to sign on.
Measuring and Validating Disagreeable Rhetoric

For our dependent variable, we examine all US Supreme Court opinions from the 1946 to
2011 terms. While some work has explored other forms of disagreeability (e.g., Black et al.
2011), very little explores written opinions (but see Wedeking and Zilis 2018), which is
unfortunate since these are the clearest means through which the justices communicate
with interested audiences, policy makers, and other actors in the political and legal system.
As such, the language used in written opinions has tremendous importance in shaping
subsequent developments both inside and outside of the legal system. Furthermore, we
anticipate that our approach is a conservative one, since justices are much less likely to
employ inﬂammatory language in carefully thought-out written opinions than they would
be in oral arguments or oral dissents.8
We examine three different measures of disagreeable language from two different computer programs. We do so because it enables us to make more robust claims if our results are
replicable across different data sets and coding schemes. The ﬁrst computer program is the
Dictionary of Affect in Language (DAL), which measures the emotional meaning of words
and texts (Whissell et al. 1986; Whissell 1989). The program observes the frequency with
which a set of words, corresponding to a given emotional construct, occurs in a text, rating
each word for its degree on three dimensions: activeness, pleasantness, and imagery. DAL
has been widely used in psychology and was previously used in political science to study the
Supreme Court (Black et al. 2011).
For our ﬁrst two indicators that capture disagreeable language, we make use of the
DAL subdictionaries of “nasty” and “very unpleasant” words. Nasty words are those that
score in the top quartile for activation and the bottom quartile for pleasantness, while very
8. We recognize that our focus on written opinions introduces complexity into the attribution
phase, since the justices’ law clerks have taken on an increasingly important role in crafting opinion language (Peppers 2006; Ward and Weiden 2006). Since these clerks function as agents for the justices
themselves, however, and the justices must ultimately sign off on opinions, we believe that we can glean
an understanding of interpersonal differences on the Court through our approach. More importantly,
our primary goal in this article is not to offer an account of justice-speciﬁc effects but rather a theory of
how personal importance inﬂuences disagreeability.
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unpleasant words are in the bottom decile for pleasantness; as such, both give us insight
into the disagreeability of opinions.
A third measure of disagreeable rhetoric examines the negative emotion category from
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC), a textual analysis software package that operates on the same dictionary-based principles as DAL. LIWC employs a word count strategy that searches whatever text is under review for over 2,300 words (or word stems) using
speciﬁc, validated dictionaries (Pennebaker and King 1999). LIWC has also been employed to study the Court on several occasions (e.g., Owens and Wedeking 2011; Corley
and Wedeking 2014; Cross and Pennebaker 2014) and has a specially designed dictionary
of negative emotion words. LIWC’s dictionaries were designed speciﬁcally for capturing tone; their validity and reliability have been extensively tested by previous scholars
(Pennebaker and King 1999; Tausczik and Pennebaker 2009).
Factor analysis of these three indicators conﬁrms that they have an underlying unidimensional structure. Cronbach’s alpha is 0.785, and the eigenvalue of the ﬁrst extracted
factor is 1.337 (the second is 20.139). The factor loadings range from 0.628 (negative
emotional words) to 0.695 (very unpleasant words). Given this evidence, we create a factor
variable using a simple regression method. Using the factor variable provides the added
beneﬁt that it focuses on the variance common to all three measures, which we assume
to be disagreeable rhetoric, and reduces reliance on idiosyncratic effects of each individual
measure. This added robustness protects against misleading false positives from words that
may be used in one dictionary but not the other two. Importantly, in the following model
estimates, if we use all three indicators individually (rather than the factor variable that
combines all three), we get nearly identical results (see the appendix). Written opinions
range from 22.599 (mild) to 6.188 (harsh), with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of
0.819. To provide a more concrete illustration of the variance, we can focus on one indicator that is a component of the factor score: the percentage of nasty words used by the
justices. This ranges between 0% and 12.5% in a given opinion, with a mean of 3.657%.
While this may seem like a small difference at ﬁrst, remember we are talking about opinions
that contain thousands of words (our mean majority opinion length is over 4,000 words).
To explore the properties and validity of our dependent variable, ﬁgure 1 plots three
distributions of disagreeable rhetoric, one for each type of opinion (majority, concurrence,
and dissent). As ﬁgure 1 demonstrates, the distribution for each opinion type is very similar. In addition, ﬁgure 1 highlights 10 opinions along the distribution to provide further
context for how these opinions map onto our dependent variable.
To provide more detail about some of the cases that exhibit high levels of disagreeable
rhetoric, let us consider three cases that appear on ﬁgure 1. First, Justice White’s dissent in
Booth v. Maryland (469 U.S. 221 [1985]) has an extremely high score. Consider these two
quotes from the opinion:
The affront to humanity of a brutal murder such as petitioner committed is not
limited to its impact on the victim or victims; a victim’s community is also injured,
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Figure 1. Distribution of disagreeable rhetoric, across opinion types. There are
10 opinions highlighted in the distribution to provide a greater description of the content
of the measure. Each opinion lists the opinion author by type as well as the author’s initials.
PS 5 Potter Stewart; WJB 5 William J. Brennan; WHR 5 William H. Rehnquist; RBG 5
Ruth Bader Ginsburg; TCC 5 Tom C. Clark; WEB 5 Warren E. Burger; AMK 5 Anthony M.
Kennedy; HAB 5 Harry A. Blackmun; BRW 5 Byron R. White.

and in particular the victim’s family suffers shock and grief of a kind difﬁcult
even to imagine for those who have not shared a similar loss. . . .
The Court is “troubled by the implication that defendants whose victims were
assets to their community are more deserving of punishment than those whose victims are perceived to be less worthy,” and declares that “our system of justice does
not tolerate such distinctions.” Ante, at 506, n. 8. It is no doubt true that the State
may not encourage the sentencer to rely on a factor such as the victim’s race in determining whether the death penalty is appropriate. Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279 (1987). But I fail to see why the State cannot, if it chooses, include
as a sentencing consideration the particularized harm that an individual’s murder causes to the rest of society and in particular to his family. (Booth, 483 U.S.
at 515, 517; Justice White dissenting)
In addition, consider how Justice White’s majority opinion in Enmund v. Florida (458
U.S. 782 [1982]), which is also shown in ﬁgure 1, frames the legal question. Speciﬁcally,
he writes, the case is about “the question whether death is a valid penalty under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments for one who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor
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intended to take life” (Enmund, 458 U.S. at 787). The opinion then goes on to use the
word “death” as part of “death penalty” over 70 times. The words “killing” and “rape”
are also used extensively. Yet the harsh tone does not stop there. It also criticizes the dissent: “The dissent criticizes these statistics on the ground that they do not reveal the percentage of homicides that were charged as felony murders or the percentage of cases
where the State sought the death penalty for an accomplice guilty of felony murder.
Post at 818–819. We doubt whether it is possible to gather such information” (Enmund,
458 U.S. at 796; Justice White in the majority). These sorts of attacks are becoming
more commonplace. Consider Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in Dee Farmer v. Edward
Brennan (511 U.S. 825 [1994]), also shown in ﬁgure 1. For example, Blackmun writes,
“The Court’s analysis is fundamentally misguided; indeed it deﬁes common sense” (Farmer,
511 U.S. at 854). In sum, there is a tone and hostility that the measure seems to capture.
Additionally, when we analyze temporal trends using our measure, we see a persistent
rise in disagreeable rhetoric over time, including the fact that ﬁve of the most disagreeable
justices in the entire sample serve on the current Court. This fact is worthy of attention in
its own right, but it also suggests a measure of face validity for our dependent variable,
since recent studies note that various forms of disagreeable rhetoric appear to be on the
rise at the Court (e.g., Long and Christensen 2012).
Other Covariates

For our measure of personal importance to an author, which is our main covariate of interest in the ﬁrst stage, we generate an opinion ratio score for each justice. This captures the
number of opinions written in a legal area but strips away majority opinions, as justices
have little control over these assignments. Our measure employs the issue area codes from
the Supreme Court Database (Spaeth et al. 2018) to capture the percentage of all separate
opinions a justice authored that were in a given legal area. In generating this measure, we
include only separate opinions (dissents and concurrences) because those are the only
opinions that are completely under the control of the justices in terms of deciding whether
to write. In other words, if justices feel strongly about an issue, they may write a separate
opinion in that case, either as a concurrence (if they are in the majority coalition) or as a
separate dissent. In contrast, justices have little control over whether they get to write majority opinions, regardless of how strongly they feel about the topic (with the obvious exception of the chief justice and the senior associate justice when the chief justice is not in
the majority). Thus, we think that an indicator of how often a justice writes separately captures how strongly the justice feels about a given issue area, all else equal.9
9. The measure is constructed such that a justice who authored 100 separate opinions during his or
her time on the Court, 30 of which dealt with criminal procedure and 5 of which with civil rights,
would receive a score of 0.30 for criminal procedure and 0.05 for civil rights, indicating the relatively
high personal importance of criminal procedure compared to civil rights, with the remaining issues being assigned the relative proportion of separate opinions written in corresponding issue areas. This produces issue-ﬁxed values for each justice throughout the course of his or her tenure, which coincides with
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To verify the face validity of this measure, we calculated the issue areas that it scores as
most and least important to the justices. As expected, rights and liberties issues were among
the most signiﬁcant according to our measure. Using Supreme Court Database issue area
codes, among the issues identiﬁed as most important on average to the justices were those
involving criminal procedure, civil rights, and the First Amendment. Our measure also
identiﬁes interstate relations, attorneys, and miscellaneous issues as among the least important. We are conﬁdent that the importance measure provides a valid indication of the issues
the justices ﬁnd the most signiﬁcant.10
For our measure of coalition size, which is our dependent variable in the second stage
and also a predictor in the ﬁrst stage, we use the number of votes that agreed with the disposition made by the majority from the Supreme Court Database. For our instrument that
measures whether the Court has a missing member, we use the Supreme Court Database
to create a binary variable anytime the Court makes a decision without nine members.11
We also include a series of control variables to account for other factors associated with
both the use of harsh rhetoric and coalition size. We control for the possibility that the
personal importance of issues to nonopinion authors will affect opinion content and coalition size. To do so, we create a measure of aggregate personal importance, which is simply the mean value of all justices’ personal importance scores in a case minus the majority
author’s personal importance score. This indicates whether nonauthors see an issue as particularly important relative to the majority author’s view, which may affect their behavior
in a case.12
Additionally, we note that much of the controversy surrounding the Court’s role in
American society can be traced back to its shift in the docket and footnote 4 in United
States v. Carolene Products (304 U.S. 144 [1938]), which ended the norm of consensus
on the Court (Epstein et al. 2001). After this, the Court started taking and deciding many
cases dealing with civil rights and liberties. These topics were much more hotly contested, sharply dividing the public and the justices. For our measure of issue area (civil

our conceptualization of personal importance as relatively ﬁxed. However, our personal importance results are robust to the use of a time-variant measure.
10. We also considered other ways to operationalize the concept of personal importance. The most
obvious alternative is to generate an opinion ratio score within issue areas. This would capture the percentage of time a justice wrote separately in a particular area, out of all possible cases in that area. But issue area ratios have a disadvantage in that they do not enable us to account for the fact that the Court
tends put more cases on its docket when it ﬁnds an issue important. Ratios treat all issue areas as relatively equal in baseline importance, irrespective of whether the Court dockets 5 cases or 50 from one
area in a given term. Additionally, using issue area ratios means that a single separate opinion in a lowsalience area like interstate relations has a much greater effect on importance than the same opinion in a
high-salience area like civil rights. As such, a measure based on issue area ratios lacks the face validity of
the one on which we rely.
11. This is constructed from the “majVotes” and “minVotes” variables.
12. We also created a similar measure focused on only members of the majority coalition (instead
of all members). This does not alter the results.

The Sources and Consequences of Political Rhetoric

| 217

rights or liberties), we use a binary variable modiﬁed from the “IssueArea” variable of
the Supreme Court Database that codes values 1–6 as civil rights and liberties issues.
We also draw on the Supreme Court Database to create binary indicators for whether a
decision altered precedent or engaged in judicial review. Additionally, we measure ideological considerations by drawing on the widely used Martin-Quinn scores (Martin and
Quinn 2002). We account for ideological accommodation in a case by taking the standard
deviation in Martin-Quinn scores among members of the majority coalition. We also include measures of the number of special concurrences and regular concurrences because
those should both be related to opinion language and coalition size.
We also account for several other factors. Because an individual’s age has been shown to
be negatively correlated with the use of disagreeable language (Pennebaker, Mehl, and
Niederhoffer 2003, 556), we expect that older justices should use less disagreeable rhetoric.
For the opinion authors’ age at the time of the decision, we simply calculated the difference
in years between their birth and the decision year. Additionally, research suggests the chief
justice may play an important role as the “social leader” of the Court, with a role to ensure
that judicial work remains collegial (Black, Owens, and Wedeking 2016). Chief justice
author is a binary variable indicating whether the chief justice authored the opinion. We
also include a variable to control for the word count (in hundreds of words) of the written
opinions.
We control for a general trend toward diminished collegiality on the Court. This is
important because of the disintegration of the “norm of consensus” throughout the 1930s
and 1940s (Epstein et al. 2001) and increasing trends toward disagreeability on the bench.
To account for changes in the use of disagreeable language over time, we use a trend variable that is simply the year of the decision, enabling us to gauge the average level of disagreeable language at a given time. This is a common modeling strategy when accounting
for trends over time (e.g., Epstein et al. 1998; Shipan 2008; Farganis and Wedeking
2014). Finally, to control for the possibility that opinion disagreeability is due to certain
authors, we also include author-ﬁxed effects, although the results are robust to their exclusion (see the appendix).

A N A LYS I S 1 : D O E S P E R S O N A L I M P O R TA N C E I N F LU E N C E
D I S AG R E E A B L E R H E TO R I C I N O P I N I O N S ?

We begin by analyzing our personal importance hypothesis, using the empirical models
presented in table 1. We focus this analysis on the level of disagreeable rhetoric in separate
opinions—dissents and concurrences—because of the control that an author exerts over
the content. Put differently, separate opinion authors do not need to negotiate with colleagues in order to maintain a majority, making these opinions an appropriate avenue for
studying how the personal importance of an issue affects opinion language.
We ﬁnd substantively consistent results across our separate models for concurrences
and dissents when it comes to how disagreeable rhetoric comes about. Most notably, we
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Table 1. Estimates of Disagreeable Rhetoric in Separate Opinions

Personal importance to author
Coalition size
Aggregate personal importance (all other justices)
Issue area (civil rights or liberties)
Special concurrences
Regular concurrences
Judicial review
Altered precedent
Ideological accommodation
Author age
Chief justice author
Year
Word count
Author-ﬁxed effects?
R2
N

Dissents

Concurrences

2.100**
(.132)
.014
(.011)
1.946**
(.300)
.228**
(.026)
.007
(.013)
.005
(.012)
.005
(.039)
.031
(.064)
2.058**
(.018)
2.007
(.005)
.086
(.103)
.006
(.005)
.002**
(.0004)
Yes
.13
5,496

1.848**
(.221)
2.006
(.014)
1.743**
(.527)
.176**
(.043)
2.003
(.016)
2.013
(.016)
.015
(.056)
2.079
(.093)
2.053
(.034)
2.002
(.013)
2.006
(.239)
.003
(.013)
.006**
(.001)
Yes
.08
3,165

Note.—Ordinary least squares regression coefﬁcients with standard errors (in parentheses).
* p < .05.
** p < .01.

ﬁnd support in both types of opinions for the hypothesis that justices integrate disagreeable
language more readily on matters of high personal importance to them. The effect is quite
prominent in the case of dissenting opinions and signiﬁcant at p < :001. The model estimates that a 1 unit increase in an issue’s importance to a justice leads to a 2.10 unit increase
in disagreeable rhetoric, a change of just under 3 standard deviations. From a substantive perspective, we can better understand this effect by isolating the inﬂuence of importance on any one of our three dictionary-based indicators of disagreeability (which we have
done in the appendix). So, for example, the inﬂuence of a unit change in importance is to increase nasty words by about 3.97%. This equates to about 112 additional nasty words in
the average dissenting opinion. The comparable ﬁgures for very unpleasant and negative
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emotion language are, respectively, an increase of about 65 and 48 words in the average
dissent.
Turning to the model for concurring opinions, we also ﬁnd support for the hypothesized effect of personal importance on disagreeability. The estimated coefﬁcient demonstrates that a 1 unit increase in personal importance ramps up disagreeable rhetoric by
about 1.85 units. Again, translating this to speciﬁc subdictionary word counts, the effects
equate to an increase of about 37 nasty words, 30 very unpleasant words, and 20 negative
emotion words in the average concurrence. While this is a substantively meaningful difference, representing dozens of words in a typical opinion, we note that it is a bit smaller than
what we observed for dissents, which may be due to a few factors, including the fact dissenters might have even stronger incentives to emphasize harsh language given their losing
positions in the case. But dissenting opinions also tend to be much longer on average than
concurrences (in fact, more than double the length), which means the number of disagreeable words is naturally higher.
Turning brieﬂy to our control variables, we see that a few of them have a consistent
effect across both models. First, we have controlled for the collective importance of an issue
to all justices on the Court using an aggregate measure, and the signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on
this variable indicates that it is associated with increases in disagreeable rhetoric in both
opinion types. Also, rights and liberties cases have a similar effect in bringing about more
disagreeable language. Both of these results make some sense. They indicate that on collectively important and legally signiﬁcant issues, separate opinions tend to be more disagreeable overall. Finally, we also see that lengthier opinions are more disagreeable on average, as shown by the signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the word count variable.
Overall, the results from our ﬁrst analysis tell us something important about the determinants of disagreeable language in separate opinions, in which justices have signiﬁcant
control over the content. We ﬁnd support for our main hypothesis, indicating that in cases
personally important to them, separate-opinion authors become more willing to go the
disagreeable route. Our results also show that the substantive change in opinion language
that results is quite meaningful.
A N A LYS I S 2 : W H AT E F F E C T S D O E S D I S AG R E E A B L E
R H E TO R I C H AV E O N C OA L I T I O N S I Z E ?

Having demonstrated that disagreeable language becomes more common in dissents and
concurrences when the justices resolve cases that they ﬁnd personally important, we next
turn to exploring the implications of disagreeable opinion language. This is important because even majority opinions integrate a signiﬁcant amount of disagreeable rhetoric, yet the
effects are poorly understood. At the same time, we note that the bargaining environment is
likely to have a greater effect on the language of majority (as opposed to separate) opinions,
which suggests the potential for an endogenous relationship between disagreeable rhetoric
and majority coalition size. Our modeling approach enables us to take this into account.
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Table 2. Estimates of Disagreeable Rhetoric and Coalition Size in Majority Opinions

Personal importance to author
Coalition size
Disagreeable rhetoric
Missing member
Aggregate personal importance (all other justices)
Issue area (civil rights or liberties)
Special concurrences
Regular concurrences
Judicial review
Altered precedent
Ideological accommodation
Author age
Chief justice author
Year
Word count
Author-ﬁxed effects?
R2
F-statistic

First-Stage DV:
Opinion Disagreeability

Second-Stage DV:
Coalition Size

2.081**
(.105)
2.007
(.028)
...

...

...
2.133**
(.193)
.246**
(.020)
.037**
(.013)
.026*
(.010)
2.013
(.032)
.102
(.054)
2.055*
(.026)
2.030*
(.013)
.117
(.062)
.035**
(.013)
2.002**
(.0005)
Yes
.205
34.42

...
2.470**
(.102)
2.708**
(.042)
2.689
(.372)
2.189**
(.056)
.353**
(.018)
.100**
(.021)
2.310**
(.066)
2.051
(.114)
.835**
(.030)
2.021
(.028)
.455**
(.129)
.015
(.028)
2.013**
(.001)
Yes
.267
53.14

Note.—Two-stage least squares regression coefﬁcients with standard errors (in parentheses). DV 5 dependent
variable. N 5 6,642.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.

Table 2 contains the estimates from the two-stage least squares model, with the ﬁrst stage
using disagreeable rhetoric as the dependent variable and the second stage using majority
coalition size.13

13. As desired for two-stage least squares, our instruments theoretically satisfy the exclusion restriction
and are signiﬁcantly correlated with the outcomes of interest. The results of a Sargen-Hansen test for
overidentifying restrictions do not allow rejection of the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid.
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First, we focus brieﬂy on the ﬁrst-stage results presented in table 2. Examining the coefﬁcient estimates, we again see that author personal importance is signiﬁcant and in the
expected direction, suggesting that as a justice feels more strongly about an issue, this results in a signiﬁcantly more disagreeable opinion. The estimated coefﬁcient implies that a
1 unit increase in an issue’s importance to a justice leads to a 2.081 unit increase in disagreeable rhetoric, a change of just under 3 standard deviations. These results echo our
earlier ﬁndings for separate opinions, providing more support for the idea that in cases personally important to them, opinion authors become more willing to go the disagreeable
route. We have observed this effect for dissenting, concurring, and even majority opinions.
However, we note that the size of the effect is slightly smaller in the majority versus dissenting opinion model, perhaps suggesting that negotiation over these documents among
the coalition can blunt the impact of the issue’s personal importance to the author a bit.
More importantly, we are interested in the implications that disagreeable rhetoric has
for the size of the Court’s majority coalition. Since our model estimates simultaneously
speak to meaningful variation in the content of written opinions and their consequences
for coalition size, we turn to the results of the second stage in table 2. In other words, we
still want to know whether the justices might harm the institution when they deploy harsh
rhetoric. Can it be of any particular consequence if the Court is apparently becoming a
more disagreeable place over time?
To answer this, our primary focus is on the role of opinion disagreeability in explaining
coalition size in the second stage. We ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant negative association between opinion disagreeability and coalition size, with an increase in the use of disagreeable
rhetoric accompanied by the predicted decrease in the size of the Court’s majority coalition.
This ﬁnding suggests that there are real consequences for using disagreeable language.
But how much of an impact does disagreeable rhetoric have on the size of a majority
coalition? Figure 2 displays the estimated linear prediction for coalition size across the
range of disagreeable rhetoric. As it illustrates, a small increase in disagreeability has a small
but meaningful effect on the size of the coalition. For instance, as a majority opinion becomes harsher, moving from 2 standard deviations below to slightly above the mean,
coalition size is predicted to decrease by about one member, meaning that an ambivalent
justice may choose not to sign on to a signiﬁcantly more disagreeable opinion. Furthermore, a sizable injection of disagreeable language, moving across the range of the scale, will
sharply diminish the size of the majority. Our model predicts that, all else equal, the least
disagreeable majority opinions garner majorities of about eight members, while the most
disagreeable ones generate a minimum winning coalition.
We took a variety of steps to verify the robustness of these results (details in the appendix). First, to ensure that a subset of the justices did not drive our ﬁndings, we reran the
analyses excluding the justices who were most commonly missing from the Court when
cases were decided, which did not alter our results. We also ran our models both with
and without justice-ﬁxed effects. To ensure that our ﬁndings were not driven solely by
any one of our three dictionary-based measures of disagreeable language, we reestimated
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Figure 2. Linear predicted majority coalition size as a function of opinion disagreeability.
Estimates are derived from the second stage in table 2, with 95% confidence intervals. The
line at bottom depicts the kernel density estimation of the opinion disagreeability variable.

our models with each individual dictionary measure from either LIWC or DAL as our dependent variable. Next, we reran our majority opinion analysis as two separate equations
with errors clustered by natural court, estimating the effects of personal importance on
opinion disagreeability and those of opinion disagreeability on majority votes. Finally,
we considered other explanations that may account for variations in opinion language, including the tone used by dissenters in their written opinions. These explanations, in addition to the ones for which we have already controlled, help capture the idea that opinion
language is the product of interactions between the majority and dissenting justices in a
case. Across all alternative speciﬁcations, our results hold, demonstrating that justices write
harsher opinions in issues personally important to them and that harsh opinions decrease
the size of the majority coalition in a case.
This decrease in coalition size becomes even more important when one considers
that the size of the majority coalition can often be seen as an indicator of the strength of
the Court’s voice. For example, many Court watchers are often quick to point out one
of the most important signals that the Court sent in its Brown v. Board of Education
(347 U.S. 483 [1954]) decision was having it be a unanimous opinion. Imagine the
amount of resistance that might have been encountered if that decision had been handed
down with a 5–4 or a 6–3 decision. Recent empirical evidence veriﬁes just such an effect:
when citizens learn about division on the Court in a given case, they become less likely to
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agree (Zilis 2015) and comply with a ruling (Zink et al. 2009). When we consider this
alongside the ﬁnding from our earlier results that showed disagreeableness to be on the rise,
it is no mystery as to why we often ﬁnd recent Courts with more noticeable vote splits.
Our exploration of disagreeability’s repercussions here may hint at further peril ahead
for an institution that depends on popular support to carry out its democratic function.
C O N C LU S I O N

In this article we make several important contributions. First, we provide the ﬁrst largescale attempt to explain the level of disagreeableness in multiple opinion types. We do
so, importantly, by highlighting signiﬁcant variation in disagreeable rhetoric even after
policy disputes have been resolved. Our ﬁndings emphasize how issue importance inﬂuences opinion content and, in turn, affects majority coalition size. We ﬁnd that the personal importance of an issue to an opinion author is a strong systematic predictor of the
level of disagreeableness in opinion language.
Second, we show that this disagreeableness has real consequences for the institution.
Harsh rhetoric is associated with smaller majority coalitions on the Court, which has multiple implications. There is an ongoing debate over the costs and beneﬁts of Supreme Court
dissent (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2005; Sunstein 2014; Urofsky 2017), and one recent study suggests that it can increase perceptions of procedural fairness and acceptance of
rulings on the part of the public (Salamone 2014). Other studies, however, ﬁnd that division leads to more negative media coverage (Zilis 2015) and depresses popular support for
rulings (Baird and Gangl 2006; Zink et al. 2009), indicating that the institution has reason
for concern when it produces disagreeable opinions. But beyond attitudes toward speciﬁc
rulings, our ﬁndings also have implications when it comes to institutional support. The size
of the majority coalition is often viewed as an indicator of the strength of the voice with
which the Court is speaking, and “signals suggesting disagreement on the Court possibly
weaken the standing of the Court as an institution” (Wahlbeck et al. 1999, 491). While
others have suggested that disagreeability may imperil the Court’s legitimacy (Bryan and
Ringsmuth 2016), we offer one of the ﬁrst studies to identify the mechanism of declining
majority coalition size through which it may do so.
Third, we offer multiple tests of our constructs, indicating a robustness that cannot be
dismissed as being weak or cherry-picking the best results. Our ﬁndings, as a consequence,
have implications for the study of political rhetoric. They suggest that when an issue becomes important enough, justices use language they know may harm the institution. This
modiﬁes the existing understanding of the lengths to which the justices will go to maintain
institutional support. Rather than scrub their opinions of harsh rhetoric once judicial coalitions have formed, these actors leave a considerable degree of disagreeable rhetoric in
place in their ﬁnal written opinions. We suggest that in doing so, they may have an eye
toward winning the rhetorical struggle of the day. We note that our work is but a ﬁrst step
in suggesting that political actors may employ such rhetoric with this short-term goal in
mind. Additionally, our results have implications for the opinion assignment literature
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in suggesting that authors who write disagreeable opinions may have a harder time holding together robust majority coalitions, something of which the assigning justice may
be aware. If so, this fact may limit the ability of the Court’s most pugnacious justices to
inﬂuence majority opinions.
Finally, our results also raise important questions for the future. Speciﬁcally, among
others, we note that there is a decline in collegiality with respect to opinion writing over
time. Why is this the case? Our results suggest a need for a closer look at the changing
nature of the political environment and the shape of the Court’s docket. More speciﬁcally,
they raise the question as to whether rhetorical norms may have played a role in the demise
of the Court’s norm of consensus. While our results do not deﬁnitively tell us the answers,
they point us in that direction for future research.
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